CIRCUMVENTING AUTHORITY: LOOPHOLES
IN THE DMCA’S ACCESS CONTROLS
ADAM L. RUCKER 1

ABSTRACT
In a world where digital pirates freely roam the internet,
seemingly plundering at will, the providers of digital content must
find a way to protect their valuable assets. Digital fences afford
that protection—but not very well. Fortunately (for content
owners), 17 U.S.C. § 1201, passed as part of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, was designed to fill the
numerous gaps in those fences by forbidding activities designed to
circumvent them. In its present state, however, § 1201 does not
adequately serve that purpose. Substantial flaws in the language of
the statute render it virtually powerless to thwart piracy. If § 1201
is to fulfill its intended role (without the need for creative judicial
interpretation), it must be amended to rectify the discrepancies
between Congress’ supposed intent and the language it chose.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
In response to the spectacular technological advances that were
ushered in as part of the “digital millennium,” Congress felt the need to pass
legislation that would help ensure U.S. dominance in the global
marketplace. 2 Realizing that today’s media is, by virtue of its digital nature,
more readily pirated than its analog predecessors, Congress focused its
attention on technological measures designed to prevent unauthorized
access to digital content. 3 As part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), 4 Congress passed legislation making it illegal to circumvent the
“digital barbed wire” content owners had begun attaching to their
copyrighted works.
¶2
The idea was simple: unless it is illegal to break through the digital
fence, one resourceful hacker could potentially thwart an entire protection
scheme by distributing the virtual wire cutters to the public with impunity.
By attaching legal sanctions to both the act of cutting the wires and
1
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See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1 (1998).
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See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
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supplying the wire cutters, Congress hoped to ward off potential pirates and
provide an extra incentive for content owners to use technological access
controls. 5
However simple the idea, it has proven difficult to implement. The
statutory language of the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions currently
contains two major loopholes—both are found within the statutory
definitions. 6 Thus far, only one court has taken the opportunity to present
an in-depth textual analysis of either of these key provisions. 7 However,
given the controversy surrounding the DMCA’s access controls, Congress
would be wise to pay these loopholes strict attention—for their shrewd
opponents (the pirates) surely will.
¶3

I. THE BIRTH OF COPYRIGHT ACCESS CONTROLS
¶4
Depending on one’s personal vision of the appropriate level of
copyright protection and the propriety of policy-laundering, the way in
which the DMCA was implemented is either brilliant or ludicrous.
¶5
Shortly after his inauguration in 1992, President Bill Clinton
appointed an “Information Infrastructure Task Force” to help develop his
administration’s policy regarding the Information Superhighway. 8 Bruce
A. Lehman, the newly-appointed Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, chaired the task force’s
intellectual property Working Group. 9 Commissioner Lehman, who had
previously served as an attorney for the computer software industry, 10
quickly began working to provide copyright holders with “as much legal
control as possible over digital content.” 11 When his efforts to push
legislation through Congress were met by strong opposition from groups
such as the Digital Future Coalition, 12 Lehman turned to the international
community for (covert) assistance. 13 “He focused his attention on getting
his agenda adopted by the World Intellectual Property Organization

5

See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8.
See infra pp. 12–19.
7
I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
521, 531–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the unauthorized use of a legitimate
password does not amount to “circumvention” under § 1201).
8
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 90 (2001).
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Id.
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Id.
11
Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and
Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 121, 130 (2006).
12
LITMAN, supra note 8, at 124–25.
13
Id. at 129.
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(“WIPO”) member nations, reasoning that when the United States signed
the treaty, Congress would be obliged to adopt implementing legislation.” 14
Adopted in 1996, the WIPO Copyright Treaty 15 requires member
countries to implement “adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that
are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their [copy]rights.” 16
Even though then-current U.S. law arguably met the standards adopted by
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, “Congress used the Treaty as an excuse to
implement a much more sweeping ban on circumvention.” 17 The result
was 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 18

¶6

II. A (VERY) BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
At the dawn of the digital millennium, Congress realized that if the
law was to keep pace with the spectacular technological advances of
society, it “must adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to
disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials.” 19 Congress hailed § 1201
as an avenue for “quickly and conveniently” exposing the internet
generation to “the movies, music, software, and literary works that are the
fruit of American creative genius.” 20 It was designed to provide the
protection and legal framework necessary to establish American dominance
in the “global digital on-line marketplace for copyrighted works.” 21
¶7

“The copyright industries are one of America[’]s largest and fastest
growing economic assets.” 22 They “contribute more to the U.S. economy
and employ more workers than any single manufacturing sector, including
chemicals, industrial equipment, electronics, food processing, textiles and
apparel, and aircraft.” 23 Indeed, in 1996, the copyright industries accounted
for more foreign sales and exports than any other major industry sector. 24
¶8

¶9
The anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201 were intended to
“encourage[] technological solutions” to piracy by providing legal sanctions

14

Id.
Wipo Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996) with the Agreed Statements of the
Diplomatic Conference That Adopted the Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty].
16
Id. at art. 11.
17
Herman & Gandy, supra note 11, at 131.
18
Id.
19
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1 (1998).
20
Id. at 6.
21
See id. at 1.
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Id. at 7.
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Id.
24
Id.
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against the circumvention of such technology. 25 Realizing that “what may
be encrypted or scrambled often may be decrypted or unscrambled,”
Congress thought it necessary to provide an alternate form of protection to
those willing to invest in (and implement) “effective” technological
measures. 26 Section 1201 “does not mandate the adoption of any . . .
technological protection;” it merely “takes those technological measures
that win adoption because of their efficacy and confers [statutory]
protection on them.” 27 If, as Congress suggested, the circumvention of a
technological measure designed to protect a copyrighted work truly is “the
electronic equivalent of breaking into a locked room in order to obtain a
copy of a book,” providing a legal remedy if the lock fails seems entirely
reasonable and appropriate. 28

III. THE (UN)COPYRIGHT
Section 1201’s presence in Title 17 of the United States Code belies
the fact that it is not truly a copyright law. 29 Section 1201 neither confers
nor modifies any property rights. 30 Instead, the statute merely sanctions a
new method of protecting copyrighted works—technological access
controls. 31 Perhaps surprisingly, § 1201 does not even reserve its benefits
for copyright owners; 32 it affords the same protection to all persons,
regardless of whether they actually own the copyrights to the work they are
protecting. 33
¶10

25

Id. at 8. Citing portions of the Copyright and Communications Acts—
provisions 17 U.S.C. § 1002(c) and 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4)—the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted that such anti-circumvention is not unprecedented. Id.
26
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001).
27
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.03 (2007).
28
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(I), at 17 (1998).
29
See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178,
1192–94 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
30
Id. at 1192.
31
Id. at 1194.
32
17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006) (“Any person injured by a violation of section 1201 .
. . may bring a civil action in an appropriate United States district court for such
violation.”).
33
The provisions of § 1201 directly address “work[s] protected under [Title
17],” but do not require that the technological measures designed to protect
those works be put in place by the copyright owner. As such, the source of the
technological measure may be injured by an act of circumvention despite the
fact that his digital fence is designed to prohibit only the unauthorized access of
a protected work for which he does not hold the copyright.
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The curious nature of § 1201 emanates from the protection it
affords: access control. Section 1201(a)(1) is designed to prohibit
individuals from accessing copyrighted works via circumvention of
technological measures designed to protect those works. 34 Section
1201(a)(2), in contrast, prohibits trafficking in “any technology, product,
service, device, component, or part thereof” that 1) is “primarily designed…
for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a [copyrighted] work,” 35 2) “has only a limited
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent” an
effective technological measure, 36 or 3) “is marketed . . . for use in
circumventing” an effective technological measure. 37
¶11

¶12
It is noteworthy that one can easily run afoul of § 1201 without
infringing any of the traditional rights enjoyed by copyright owners. 38 One
need not make illegal copies or publicly display the copyrighted work to
violate § 1201. In fact, such acts clearly do not violate § 1201. Section
1201 is concerned only with how the work is accessed, not what is done
to/with the copyrighted work after access is attained.

A. Impenetrable Armor?
¶13
In the nine years since its passage, § 1201 has been used numerous
times to successfully thwart those seeking to facilitate unauthorized access
to copyrighted works. 39 Not surprisingly, the major industry players—
motion picture studios and the music recording industry— have been at the
epicenter of § 1201 litigation. They have faired very well; thus far, the
courts who have interpreted the statute have given almost perfect deference
to the will (though not necessarily the words) of Congress. 40

In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, for example, eight
major motion picture studios successfully employed the DMCA against

¶14

34

See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 105TH CONG., SECTION-BYSECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998, at 5 (Comm. Print, Serial No. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281].
35
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (2006).
36
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (2006).
37
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(C) (2006).
38
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006) (“Nothing in this section shall affect rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title.”).
39
See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001).
40
See id. at 318 (citing to various House Committee reports regarding the
purpose of § 1201).
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defendants who posted DVD decrypting software on their website. 41
Reimerdes is a prime example of the type of analysis that is usually applied
to § 1201 cases. As such, it is worthwhile to delve into the court’s
rationale.
¶15
Unlike traditional, analog video, digital video can easily be
replicated without appreciable degradation. 42 For obvious reasons, the
movie studios were apprehensive about the threat of piracy when they
developed DVD technology. 43 So, in the mid-1990s, the studios got
together with the consumer electronics industry and formulated a plan to
protect their investment. 44 Their partnership gave birth to the Content
Scramble System (“CSS”). 45
¶16
CSS is a system whereby the sound and graphic files that constitute
a DVD motion picture are encrypted according to a defined algorithm. 46 “A
CSS-protected DVD can be decrypted by an appropriate decryption
algorithm that employs a series of keys stored on the DVD and the DVD
player.” 47 The technology for making CSS-compliant DVD players was
licensed to consumer electronics manufacturers “subject to strict security
requirements,” which were designed to ensure that the keys to this newlyminted content lockbox were kept hidden from the public. 48
¶17
Despite their meager efforts, the movie studios were unable to
secure the digital content contained within their DVDs. In the fall of 1999,
a Norwegian teenager named Jon Johansen successfully cracked the
encryption scheme. 49 By reverse engineering a licensed DVD player, Mr.
Johansen uncovered both the CSS encryption algorithm and the keys needed
to operate the lock. 50

Johansen and his colleagues utilized the information they gleaned
from the DVD player to create a computer program capable of decrypting
and “ripping” encrypted DVDs, thereby allowing them to both play the
DVDs on non-compliant computers and copy the decrypted files to
computer hard drives. 51 Mr. Johansen then shared his computer program
with the world by posting the executable code on his personal Internet web
¶18

41

Id.
Id. at 309.
43
See id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 309-10.
47
Id. at 310.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 311.
50
Id.
51
Id.
42
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site. 52 Since that time, his program “has become widely available on the
Internet, where hundreds of sites now purport to offer the software for
download.” 53
Mr. Johansen’s program, DeCSS, lies at the heart of Reimerdes.
The primary defendant, Eric Corley, is a self-proclaimed cyber
revolutionary. 54 In addition to publishing a magazine called 2600: The
Hacker Quarterly, Corley also operates a website 55 dedicated to various
hacker-related interests. 56 When Corley’s web site began to offer direct
downloads of DeCSS, as well as links to “mirror” sites where visitors could
download the decryption software, the motion picture industry sought a
legal remedy. 57
¶19

¶20
The anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201 provided the studios
with ammunition. Although Corley was not himself accused of
circumventing the studios’ access controls, 58 he had almost certainly
violated § 1201(a)(2) by trafficking in circumvention technology. 59 Mr.
Corley, and those like him, were exactly the type of pirates that § 1201 was
designed to capture.
¶21
The district court first found that DeCSS constitutes “technology”
within the meaning of § 1201(a)(2). 60 Further, the court held that DeCSS
was primarily designed to circumvent CSS. 61 Indeed, as the court noted,
“that is all it does.” 62 Accordingly, Corley’s posting of DeCSS was found
to be a prima facie violation of §§ 1201(a)(2)(A) and 1201(a)(2)(B). 63
¶22
DeCSS was clearly designed to circumvent the technological
measure protecting CSS-encrypted digital video. That, however, is not

52

Id.
Id.
54
See id. at 308 (“Corley is viewed as a leader of the computer hacker
community and goes by the name Emmanuel Goldstein, after the leader of the
underground in George Orwell’s classic, 1984.”).
55
2600: The Hacker Quarterly, http://www.2600.com (last visited Jan. 21,
2009).
56
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
57
Id. at 312.
58
Id. at 316.
59
See id. at 312, 317 (stating that Corley “offered and provided and, absent a
court order, would continue to offer and provide DeCSS to the public by making
it available for download on the 2600.com web site”).
60
Id. at 317.
61
Id. at 318.
62
Id. Based upon the court’s finding, DeCSS must have no “commercially
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent a technological measure.”
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (2006).
63
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
53
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enough to satisfy § 1201. The anti-circumvention provisions of § 1201
apply only to the circumvention of technological measures that “effectively
control[] access to a work protected under [Title 17].” 64
At trial, Corley and his fellow defendants argued that CSS, “which
is based on a 40-bit encryption key, is a weak cipher that does not
‘effectively control’ access to [the studios’] copyrighted works.” 65 Corley’s
argument was based on a marked misreading of (or complete failure to read)
§ 1201. Corley’s contention—that successful circumvention proves that the
technological measure was not effective—is, as the district court aptly
remarked, “indefensible.” 66 “The mere circumstance that [a] defendant has
deactivated the subject technology cannot mean that the technology fails to
offer ‘effective control’ as otherwise the statute would be rendered
nonsensical.” 67
¶23

In holding that CSS “effectively controls” access to the copyrighted
work, the court purported to focus its attention on the statutory definition
provided in § 1201(a)(3). 69 Section 1201(a)(3)(B) stipulates that
“effective” control requires the “authority of the copyright owner.” Without
the authority of the studios, it reasoned, Corley could not have “legally
gain[ed] access to the keys” needed to decrypt the CSS algorithm. 70 Ergo,
CSS must be “effective” because the copyright owner’s permission is
required in order to properly operate the system.
¶24

68

¶25
“This view,” the court declared, “is confirmed by the legislative
history.” 71 The House Judiciary Committee’s section-by-section analysis of
§ 1201 states that “[t]he practical, commonsense approach taken by [the
statute] is that if, in the ordinary course of its operation, a technology
actually works in the defined ways to control access . . . then the
‘effectiveness’ test is met, and the prohibitions of the statute are
applicable.” 72 The “ordinary course of operation” for CSS, the court
determined, is confined to those instances “when DeCSS or some other
decryption program is not employed.” 73 Since CSS “actually works” in
those instances, it is an “effective” technological measure. 74

64

17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (2006).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
66
Id.
67
NIMMER, supra note 27.
68
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
69
See id. at 317–18.
70
Id. at 317.
71
Id. at 318.
72
ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281, supra note 34, at 10.
73
See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
74
Id.
65
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Following Reimerdes, the entertainment industry giants have used
§ 1201 to wage a very successful campaign against media pirates. In 321
Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., several prominent members
of the Motion Picture Association of America attained an injunction against
the unauthorized distribution of computer software that was capable of both
decrypting and copying CSS-protected DVDs. 75
Likewise, Sony
successfully invoked § 1201 to obtain an injunction against the owner of a
website that sold various devices designed to circumvent the authentication
process guarding its PlayStation game consoles. 76
¶26

B. Porous Sieve?
¶27
Based upon the overwhelming success enjoyed by the content
owners who have asserted their right to control access under § 1201, one
might assume that the statute provides ironclad protection against content
thieves. Yet the rather superficial statutory interpretation undertaken by the
majority of courts to interpret § 1201 masks a fatal flaw in the statute’s
language. Upon closer examination, the seemingly foolproof protection of
§ 1201 appears quite porous.

In I.M.S. Inquiry Management Systems, Ltd. v. Berkshire
Information Systems, Inc., 77 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York issued a rather shocking ruling. Rather than
cut and paste the standard logic employed in the court’s Reimerdes decision,
the panel took a more critical look at the language of the statute. 78 In what
may be the first of many losses for the content industry, 79 the court held that
¶28

75

321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085,
1105 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that distribution
of the software did not violate the DMCA, or, in the alternative, that the anticircumvention provisions were invalid; plaintiffs were disappointed in both
respects. Id.
76
Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Divineo, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
77
I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
521, 531–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
78
See id. at 532 (“Circumvention requires either descrambling, decrypting,
avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating or impairing a technological
measure qua technological measure. In the instant matter, defendant is not said
to have avoided or bypassed the deployed technological measure in the
measure’s gatekeeping capacity. . . . [Here], what defendant avoided and
bypassed was permission to engage and move through the technological
measure from the measure's author.”).
79
“I.M.S. was correctly decided. Circumvention, as defined in the DMCA, is
limited to actions that ‘descramble,’ ‘decrypt,’ ‘avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate or impair a technological measure.’ What is missing from this
statutory definition is any reference to ‘use’ of a technological measure without
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the “unauthorized use of an otherwise legitimate, owner-issued password”
does not constitute a violation of § 1201. 80 In so doing, it highlighted a
potentially devastating chink in the DMCA’s armor: § 1201(a)(3).

IV. CHINKS IN THE ARMOR
¶29
The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether its
language has a plain, unambiguous meaning. 81 “Where the language is
plain and admits to no more than one meaning . . . the rules which are to aid
in doubtful meanings need no discussion. 82 As Chief Justice Marshall once
stated, if the language of the statute is plain, “it must be obeyed.” 83
¶30
Section 1201 is unequivocal in its terms. It forbids the
circumvention of technological measures that “effectively control” access to
copyrighted works 84 and trafficking in certain articles that make such
circumvention possible. 85 According to the language of the statute,if the
technological measure does not “effectively control[] access to a
[copyrighted] work,” no amount of circumvention is forbidden.
¶31
Section 1201(a)(3) clearly delineates the bounds of “digital
trespass.” 86 Both of the access control provisions found in § 1201—the
normal anti-circumvention provision found in § 1201(a)(1) and the antitrafficking provision located in § 1201(a)(2)—are governed by the statutory
definitions laid out in § 1201(a)(3). The definitions in § 1201(a)(3) firmly
establish the limits of those activities that fall within the purview of the
statute’s access controls. Section 1201(a)(3) provides:

(A) to “circumvent a technological measure” means to
descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted
work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove,

the authority of the copyright owner, and the court declines to manufacture such
language now.” Egilman v. Keller & Heckman, LLP, 401 F. Supp. 2d 105, 113
(D.D.C. 2005).
80
See I.M.S. v. Berkshire, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 531–33.
81
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
82
Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899).
83
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (emphasis added).
84
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“No person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
[Title 17].”).
85
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006) (“No person shall manufacture, import, offer to
the public, provide or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service,
device, component, or part thereof . . . .”).
86
Chamberlain Group, Inc.v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1196 (“[T]he
DMCA created circumvention liability for ‘digital trespass’ under §
1201(a)(1).”).
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deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without
the authority of the copyright owner; and
(B) a technological measure “effectively controls access to
a work” if the measure, in the ordinary course of its
operation, requires the application of information, or a
process or a treatment, with the authority of the
copyright owner, to gain access to the work. 87
¶32
The statutory definitions provided in § 1201(a)(3) create two
loopholes in the access controls designed to discourage digital piracy.
Section 1201(a)(3)(A) provides only a small chink in the DMCA’s accesscontrol armor: a relatively narrow definition of “circumvention.” Section
1201(a)(3)(B), on the other hand, effectively obliterates whatever protection
is left.

A. Circumvention . . . is sometimes possible
As defined in § 1201(a)(3)(A), circumvention involves any effort to
“descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise
to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure,
without the authority of the copyright owner.” Except for descrambling and
decrypting, circumvention requires activity outside the normal scope of
operation, some action undertaken to avoid the normal processes by which
the technological measure operates. Mere lack of authority to utilize the
process is not enough to trigger § 1201(a)(3)(A).
¶33

¶34
One cannot “circumvent a technological measure” simply by
utilizing a legitimate password without authorization. 88 Such conduct does
not avoid or bypass the technological measure; it uses an appropriate key in
precisely the manner in which the key was designed to function. The fact
that the use of the key was unauthorized is irrelevant because
“circumvention” is explicitly limited to the activities listed in
§ 1201(a)(3)(A).
¶35
The descrambling and decrypting of protected content presents a
more difficult problem: any unauthorized use of the proper key leads
directly to the forbidden activity. 89 The shortcomings of the statutory
language with regard to avoidance and bypass are subsumed by the very
87

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3) (2006).
I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
521, 531–33 (S.D.N.Y 2004). Contra Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,
111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer
Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
89
Were it not for § 1201(a)(3)(A)’s explicit inclusion of decryption in the
statutory definition, the unauthorized use of even the most complex encryption
key might arguably fit into the avoid-bypass loophole.
88
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nature of decryption and descrambling technology. Whereas the use of a
key consisting of a simple password allows one to slip through a loophole in
the language of the statute, any unauthorized use of a complex encryption
key (that succeeds in decrypting the work) amounts to circumvention of a
technological measure. 90

B. Effective Control . . . is virtually nonexistent
¶36
If § 1201(a)(3)(A) was the only statutorily-defined limitation
included in the access controls of § 1201, it would be fairly easy for content
owners to avoid the “circumvention” loophole and achieve the desired
protection. Simply by encrypting or scrambling their data, they could
establish a foolproof protection scheme—any unauthorized use of the
appropriate decryption/descrambling key would amount to
“circumvention,” as would any effort to “avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate,
or impair” the decryption/scrambling technology. The makers and
distributors of decryption/descrambling devices would have virtually no
chance of escaping liability.
¶37
Fortunately for all of the scurvy pirates out there, the Information
Technology Industry Council lobbied hard for the inclusion of an explicit
definition of what constitutes an “effective” technological measure. 91 In
particular, they wanted to specify that “effective” technological measures
“must be strong, ‘active’ measures, such as encryption or scrambling, which
obscure the content itself.” 92 “Implementing legislation that did not draw a
clear distinction between ‘effective’ technological measures and all others,”
they feared, “would leave us with a Hobbesian choice of producing slow,
‘legal’ computers or fast, ‘illegal’ computers.” 93 A noble effort for a
worthy cause, but it resulted in a second loophole that is much bigger than
the first!
¶38
Section § 1201(a)(3)(B) states that “a technological measure
‘effectively controls access to a work’ if the measure, in the ordinary course
of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or a
treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the
work.” 94 In other words, a technological measure is not “effective” unless
90

This is so because the language of § 1201(a)(3)(A) with regard to
descrambling & decrypting is framed in terms of the result achieved, not the
action taken.
91
See Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong.(1998) (statement of Chris Byrne, Silicon Graphics, Inc.,
on behalf of the Information Technology Industry Council).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006).
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it ordinarily requires two things: 1) the application of some information or
process, and 2) “the authority of the copyright owner.” 95 The inclusion of
the latter requirement is effectively a death knell to the anti-circumvention
provisions of § 1201.
¶39
Virtually all technological measures require “the application of
information, or a process or a treatment.” 96 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
the existence of a technological measure that granted access in the absence
of such an application. Even the most rudimentary access controls—such as
the automatic doors at your local pharmacy—require the application of
information (i.e., that you have just broken the plane of its motion detecting
radar, or stepped on its pressure-sensitive floor mat) in order to grant access
to the user.
¶40
The majority of technological access controls do not, however,
require “the authority of the copyright owner.” If the appropriate
information or process is applied, the technological measure will grant
access regardless of whether the party applying the required information or
process actually had permission to engage the system. Because the
information or process applied to engage the access control is identical in
both the legitimate and illicit contexts, the technological measure is not,
itself, capable of distinguishing between those two applications. As such,
the vast majority of technological measures do not fulfill the latter
requirement of § 1201(a)(3)(B), and therefore do not “effectively control[]
access to a [copyrighted] work.”

V. WHAT’S WRONG WITH REIMERDES?
¶41
This strict, textual interpretation of § 1201(a)(3) is directly at odds
with prior case law, which gave a much broader reading to the language of
the statute. In what appears to be an effort to give life to the intent of
Congress, the courts interpreting § 1201 have thus far glossed over the
critical language of § 1201(a)(3)(B). 97 In Reimerdes, for instance, the court
completely divorced the technological measure from the authority

95

Id.
By definition, a “technological” measure must relate to or involve technology.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2004), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/technological.
Technology, in turn, necessitates the practical application of science or other
such information. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004), available at
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/technology.
97
Even the I.M.S. v. Berkshire court ignored the authority requirement of
§ 1201(a)(3)(B). See I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys.,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 521, 531 (S.D.N.Y 2004).
96
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requirement when it evaluated the “effectiveness” of CSS encryption
software: 98
One cannot gain access to a CSS-protected work on a DVD without
application of the three keys that are required by the software. One
cannot lawfully gain access to the keys except by entering into a
license with . . . the copyright owners or by purchasing a DVD player
or drive containing the keys pursuant to a license. In consequence, . . .
CSS ‘effectively controls access’ to copyrighted DVDs. 99

This same flawed logic has been rehashed in subsequent cases. 100
Section 1201 does not contain a separate requirement that the
“keys” required to open a technological access control—the information or
process required by the technological measure—be “lawfully obtained.”
Section 1201(a)(3)(B) clearly never addresses how those “keys” were
obtained; it requires only that the technological measure actually requires
their application. Indeed, the statutory definition of “effective control” is
focused solely on the operation of the technological measure itself. There is
no mention of content pirates or their ill-gotten “keys.”

¶42

The only way to rectify the “effectiveness” analysis of Reimerdes
with the text of § 1201(a)(3)(B) is to assume that the “ordinary course of [a
technological measure’s] operation” is limited to situations wherein the
party “lawfully gain[s] access to the keys” 101 required to engage that
measure. That assumption, however, cannot be valid. Were it true, the
validity of that assumption would render the authority requirement of the
provision completely superfluous. By explicitly defining “effective”
technological measures as those that refuse to grant access in the absence of
“the authority of the copyright owner,” § 1201 implicitly acknowledges that
all technological measures do not contain such a requirement as part of their
“ordinary course of operation.” Consequently, it is erroneous to assume
that the “ordinary course of [CSS] operation” (or that of any other access
control) inherently requires permission to engage the technological
measure.
¶43

¶44
A court must therefore make a factual finding that a given
technological measure (not the measure’s author) in fact requires that the
user have authority to use the key as part of its “ordinary course of

98

See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 317–18
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
99
Id.
100
See, e.g., 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
2d 1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting Reimerdes for the proposition that CSS
is an “effective” technological measure).
101
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 317–18.
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operation.” But, as was previously discussed, 102 such a determination must
undoubtedly be based upon a legal fiction. In reality, technological
measures cannot distinguish between the application of identical
information by a legitimate user and a key-thieving pirate.
¶45
It is not enough that the court thinks that the measure should require
such authority. The statute plainly mandates that the measure must actually
require “the authority of the copyright owner.”

VI. A CALL TO AMEND
¶46
If the DMCA is to provide an effective safeguard for technological
access controls, it must be amended to close the loopholes present in
§ 1201(a)(3). The shortcomings of the statute are not merely semantic—
one of the loopholes has already been judicially exposed, 103 and it is only a
matter of time before the other is asserted. Indeed, pirates who find
themselves accused of violating § 1201—and those generally opposed to the
DMCA’s access controls—would be wise to mount a defense based upon
the technical language of §§ 1201(a)(3)(A) and 1201(a)(3)(B).
¶47
However tempted they may be, courts should resist the urge to
judicially rewrite § 1201 to say what they “know” it is supposed to say. “It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is,” 104 not what it should be. “Statutory construction must,”
therefore, “begin with the language employed by Congress and the
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses
the legislative purpose.” 105 For “where the language of the act is explicit,
there is great danger in departing from the words used, to give an effect to
the law which may be supposed to have been designed by the
legislature.” 106
¶48
Moreover, courts should avoid rushing to judgment about
Congress’ intentions regarding the access controls (supposedly) embodied
in § 1201. Given the current state of unrest amongst content users and legal
academics, 107 it would be wise to force Congress to wrestle with the

102

See supra pp. 14–15.
See I.M.S. Inquiry Mgmt. Sys., Ltd. v. Berkshire Info. Sys., Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y 2004)..
104
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
105
Park ‘n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
106
Denn v. Reid, 35 U.S. 525, 527 (1836).
107
See generally Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Really Created a New Exclusive Right of Access?: Attempting to Reach a
Balance Between Users’ and Content Providers’ Rights, 49 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 277 (2001); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy
103
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provisions of § 1201. If Congress truly wishes to provide the U.S.
copyright industry with impenetrable access controls, it is certainly free to
amend the statute. 108 Simply strengthening the language of § 1201(a)(3)
should not be a daunting task—provided, of course, that granting such
strong access controls is still the will of Congress.
The E.U. Directive enacting the relevant portions of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty provides one example of language that would aptly
express the supposed will of Congress. 109 There, “effective” technological
measures are defined as those whereby “the use of a protected work . . . is
controlled by the rightholders through application of an access control or
protection process . . . which achieves the protection objective.” 110 So long
as “the protection objective” is defined to be something akin to “a
substantial reduction in the likelihood of unauthorized access,” adoption of
the aforementioned language would extend the protection of § 1201 to
virtually all technological access controls.
¶49

CONCLUSION
¶50
In its present state, § 1201 does not provide strong legal protection
for technological measures designed to prevent the unauthorized access of
copyrighted works. With a few minor tweaks in the language of the statute,
however, it could become a legitimate bulwark against the ever-increasing
threat of digital piracy. The courts, should not be the instrument of that
change. Instead, the courts should pursue their traditional duties with
increased fervor, faithfully giving life to the plain meaning of § 1201.
Leave to Congress the job of closing the loopholes.

Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111 (2005).
108
Indeed, three proposed amendments to the language of § 1201 are already on
the floor of Congress. H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3155, 110th Cong.
(2007); S. 2317, 110th Cong. (2007).
109
See Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC).
110
Id. art. 17.

